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Abstract: The article examines how nuclear risk was perceived by German and Japanese journalists 
covering the Fukushima Disaster. Drawing from the theoretical framework of Beck’s World Risk So-
ciety, the journalists’ personal risk perceptions are reconstructed from narrative interviews, adding 
an important variable to the understanding of journalistic communication on risk and disaster. The 
results indicate that German correspondents in Japan were highly concerned about their personal 
safety while Japanese journalists hardly showed any anxiety with regard to the nuclear disaster. The 
varying perceptions also widely applied to the journalists’ professional experience of the disaster, 
although further influences like organizational culture came into play as well. The article concludes 
that historically shaped discourses are an important macro factor for media reporting on risk and 
disaster. 
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Introduction: National perspectives on a global disaster 
 
As we know from the works of Beck (1992, 2009), risks can be either dramatized or 
downplayed depending on the norms1 that decide about what is known and what 
remains unknown in a given society. Especially when it comes to risks that are sci-
entifically hard to determine, such norms come into play and often lead to funda-
mentally different assessments across societies. This is precisely what Beck (2009) 
called the “clash of risk cultures”. According to the author, the role of media in the 
representation of risk (and, consequently, disaster) is crucial and has far-reaching 
political implications. One of the unresolved problems in this context is that while 
                                                 
1 This paper follows the definition of Hechter (2001, p. xi) in that “Norms are cultural phenomena 
that prescribe and proscribe behaviour in specific circumstances. As such, they have long been 
considered to be at least partially responsible for regulating social behavior.” Unlike legal norms, 
which are codified rules, social norms are often informal and dynamic representations of accepted 
behavior. They are subject to ongoing social negotiation processes, with the result that “contradictory 
norms will emerge, or the group with the strongest interest will succeed in having norms that benefit 
it will prevail.” (Horne, 2001, p. 17) 
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many of the risks and disasters we face today do not adhere to national borders (e.g. 
climate change, terrorism, nuclear accidents), the nation-state framework continues 
to shape traditional media discourses (Cottle, 2009, 2014; Pantti, Wahl-Jorgensen, 
& Cottle, 2012). This holds true even in case of the Fukushima Disaster, a “transna-
tional media event” (Rantasila, Sirola, Kekkonen, Valaskivi, & Kunelius, 2018) that 
triggered nuclear phase-outs in Germany, Switzerland, South Korea, and Taiwan.  
International studies revealed remarkable differences with regard to how the disas-
ter was reported, in particular different national views on the gravity of the nuclear 
disaster and risks related to radiation (Hayashi, 2013; Hayashi & Chung, 2013; Kep-
plinger & Lemke, 2014, 2015; Kowata et al., 2012; Schwarz, 2014; to mention a few). 
The comparison of news coverage in Japan and Germany yields one of the most out-
standing examples of this phenomenon. While Japanese media initially focused on 
the earthquake and tsunami disaster (Tanaka & Hara, 2012; Tkach-Kawasaki, 
2012), German news outlets concentrated on the crippled power plant from the start 
(Hayashi, 2013; Kowata et al., 2012). Concerning the nuclear hazard, media cover-
age in Japan largely followed the official line and focused on avoiding panic and so-
called “harmful rumors”2 (Itō, 2012; Yamada, 2013), paying relatively little attention 
to health-related risks (Schwarz, 2014). On the contrary, many German media out-
lets were criticized for erroneous and exaggerating reports of the nuclear disaster 
(Coulmas & Stalpers, 2011). Kepplinger and Lemke (2014, 2015), who had found a 
strong anti-nuclear bias in German news coverage as compared to other European 
media, even accused German media of instrumentalizing the disaster and behaving 
like anti-nuclear “activists” (2014, 149).  
 
How can the different ways of reporting be explained? First, it is important to note 
that foreign coverage of disasters is often more negative and emotional than report-
ing of a domestic disaster (Pantti et al., 2012, 66–67). This explanation, however, 
does not seem to be sufficient given the fundamental differences outlined above. The 
analysis has to go deeper because media messages are influenced by a variety of fac-
tors on macro, meso, and micro levels (Shoemaker & Reese, 2014).  
 
Following this logic, Meissner (2019, 51–113) showed in a systematic literature re-
view that Japanese and German journalism is characterized by several important 
differences. To mention three key aspects: 1) The Japanese media system has com-
paratively close ties to the political and the economic systems. This is manifest in a 
network of so-called ‘reporter clubs’ (kisha kurabu) in ministries, companies etc., 
where a primary goal of Japanese reporters is to establish close relationships with 
decision-makers, often resulting in collusion and uncritical reporting. 2) With re-
gard to the style of reporting, media coverage tends to have a more subjective slant 
in Germany than in Japan, where reporting is known for its strict focus on officially 
confirmed facts. 3) On the micro level, the political leaning of journalists in Germany 
tends to be left of center. Surprisingly, there is no useful data on the political orien-
tation of Japanese journalists, but it is important to note that the reporters of the 
                                                 
2 The original term fūhyō here refers to the anxiety of consumers concerning radioactive contamina-
tion of food products in particular. 
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big media organizations in Japan, especially the newspapers, typically come from 
the same elite universities as the political and economic leaders of the country. 
While the so described journalistic cultures should be considered an important con-
text factor for the mentioned differences in reporting the Fukushima Disaster, they 
still do not entirely explain them. This paper therefore aims at exploring another 
crucial aspect: how journalists’ perceptions of the disaster were shaped by dis-
courses on nuclear power in their country of origin. Secondly, the paper is aimed at 
a related and not less important aspect: how journalists conceived their role in the 
political debate about nuclear risk. 
 
To clarify a key term of this paper, ‘risk’ refers to the possibility of a disaster, imply-
ing potential harm to human life and/or damage to property. In risk sociology, the 
term is attributed a human-made quality whereas ‘danger’ can also be of natural 
origin (Beck, 1992, 2009). According to Bonfadelli (2004), risk has a technical and 
a social dimension. The former refers to a probabilistic risk calculus based on scien-
tific methods. The latter refers to the social negotiation processes that, among other 
aspects, influence the perceived gravity and acceptability of different types of risk. 
 
 
News reporting of technological risk 
 
In the context of debates surrounding the public’s acceptance of technologies such 
as nuclear energy, scholars critically analyzed a plethora of communicative prob-
lems from early on. Among them are the role of cognitive biases in decision-making 
on risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), differences between experts and lay peoples’ 
judgments (Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, & Roe, 1981), or the social and psycho-
logical factors behind the public perception of risk (Renn, 1984), to mention only a 
few. A popular model that combined different lines of research within this paradigm 
was the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (Kasperson et al., 1988). 
 
However, it was not until the Chernobyl Disaster in 1986 that the role of the mass 
media in shaping risk perceptions became the center of attention. Some scholars 
argued that journalists distorted the gravity of risks, often based on leftist political 
convictions (Kepplinger, 1988, 1991; Lichter, Rothman, & Lichter, 1986; Rothman 
& Lichter, 1987). These studies were based on a technology-centered risk concept 
and postulated that media reporting should reserve to a news format based more or 
less exclusively on information provided by scientific experts.  
Other researchers have argued that news coverage, while being based on scientific 
facts, should also include the social dimension of technological risk and open the 
debate to the broad public (Bonfadelli, 1999, 2004; Ruhrmann, 1992, 1996). This 
tradition is particularly strong in the German-speaking academic community and 
has been backed by risk sociologists like Luhmann (1986, 1991) and Beck (1992, 
2009).  
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More recently, the focus of research has shifted to less normative approaches ana-
lyzing how journalists3 select and portray reports on technological risk (Guenther, 
Froehlich, & Ruhrmann, 2015; Wilkinson, Allan, Anderson, & Petersen, 2007). Im-
portant factors are for example news values, organizational factors but also the jour-
nalistic self-concept. Given that public risk perception is largely culture-dependent 
(Beck, 2009), however, there is surprisingly little research that takes into account 
the broader cultural and historical context of risk communication (an exception is 
Kuhnhenn, 2017, who demonstrated that depending on the subject of investigation, 
risk communication research needs to acknowledge historical, political, cultural, 
and socio-political backgrounds). The paper will therefore focus on this aspect in the 
context of media reporting about the Fukushima Disaster. 
 
 
The evolvement of discourses on nuclear power in Germany and Japan  
 
In 1953, then U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower initiated his “Atoms for Peace” 
campaign during a much noted speech at the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions. He propagated the peaceful use of atomic energy and announced the technol-
ogy would be helpful to build a safe and prosperous future for societies worldwide. 
Germany and Japan were among the countries that initially embraced the idea of 
civil nuclear technology (Radkau 2011, 210–211, 219–22). Both countries built first 
reactors throughout the 1960s.  
However, from the first half of the 1970s onwards, local demonstrations against 
planned nuclear facilities began to spread across Germany. Protests in places such 
as Wyhl, Brokdorf, Gorleben and Krümmel marked the beginning of the most pow-
erful anti-nuclear movement worldwide (Radkau & Hahn 2013, 302–311). Maybe 
the most important turning point was the Chernobyl Disaster in 1986: It caused the 
diffusion of radioactive fallout across large parts of Europe including Germany. This 
led to widespread anxiety in the German population and to a growing reservation 
against the technology (ibid., 340). According to Seiffert and Fähnrich (2014), it was 
the key moment for the anti-nuclear discourse in Germany and paved the way for 
the later nuclear phase-out.  
 
Already back in 1986, the role of the media was heavily debated. According to Kep-
plinger (1988), German news media had already started to assess nuclear energy 
more critical from the mid-1960s, but especially from the 1970s onwards. He found 
that the main effect of the Three Mile Island accident (1979) and the Chernobyl Dis-
aster (1986) on the mediated debate was just an intensification of the already prev-
alent skepticism towards nuclear energy. It is striking, however, that other studies 
yielded quite different results. Van Buiren (1975, cited in Radkau & Hahn, 2013, 
284) analyzed a large sample of newspaper articles and found that between 1970 
and 1974, only a small proportion included concerns with regard to nuclear power. 
                                                 
3 Of course, social media has a growing influence on public risk communication (Weingart et al. 
2017). However, studies such as the one by Wolling and Arlt (2015) show that traditional journalistic 
media continues to play an important role in shaping public perceptions of technological risk.  
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Even after the Chernobyl Disaster, pro-nuclear voices were clearly more frequent in 
the coverage of five national newspapers than anti-nuclear voices according to a 
study by Rager, Klaus and Thyen (1987). 
 
A review of the literature concerning the discourse on nuclear energy in Japan re-
veals clear differences. The fact that there was no significant controversy about nu-
clear energy before 2011 is quite surprising according to Radkau (2011, 219–221) – 
given that the country suffered the traumatic experience of two atomic bombs. Weiss 
(2019, 84–100) explains that Japanese politics and industry effectively managed to 
separate the national trauma from the civil use of the technology with the help of 
nationwide networking and campaigning activities. Among the main actors working 
towards the goal of the development of the nuclear power sector were the Japan 
Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF) founded in 1956, which held regional meetings for 
the advancement of nuclear energy with politicians, scientists and media represent-
atives across the country (ibid., 94–97). Further promotional activities were con-
ducted by the Japan Atomic Energy Relations Organization (JAERO) founded in 
1969, which was more specifically aimed at journalists (ibid., 113–115). Of course, 
lobby organizations promoting nuclear energy also existed (and continue to exist) 
in Germany. The most important one is Kernenergie Deutschland (Nuclear Energy 
Germany)4, which worked towards increasing the technology’s acceptance in Ger-
many. However, nuclear lobbyism was clearly more far-reaching in Japan, where 
promotional content even spread to school books and popular culture (Weiss, 2019, 
98—99, 128). Also, the amount spent in 2010 by the German nuclear industry on 
advertising in journalistic media was 121 million Euros (Axel Springer AG, 2011); in 
the same year, Japanese energy firms invested an equivalent of 810 million Euros 
on advertisements in news outlets (McNeill, 2012). 
 
Consequently, it was achieved to win an important part of Japan’s media landscape 
over the pro-nuclear agenda. In a framing analysis of serialized articles in the three 
biggest Japanese newspapers, Weiss (2019, 356) showed that especially the Yomiuri 
Shimbun, the newspaper with the highest circulation in the world, and the prestig-
ious Asahi Shimbun propagated nuclear energy before 2011. The Japanese anti-nu-
clear movement, while successfully organizing resistance against several planned 
nuclear facilities since the early 1970s, struggled with achieving significant and sus-
tainable media presence (ibid., 106–108). 
 
In contrast to the German case, the Chernobyl Disaster did not inspire leading Jap-
anese newspapers to question the safety of domestic nuclear energy (Abe, 2013). 
Despite growing concern in the population, national media typically either sug-
gested to further improve nuclear safety or just stressed there was no reason to be-
lieve anything similar could happen in Japan. Nuclear skeptics were sometimes de-
nounced as irrational or even hysterical; several papers also stressed the need to 
export Japanese nuclear technology to contribute to global nuclear safety (ibid., 
                                                 
4 Until 2019, the organization was known as Deutsches Atomforum (German Atomic Forum). 
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1978–1980). This kind of coverage exemplifies what critics – especially after the Fu-
kushima disaster – called the nuclear ‘safety myth’ (anzen shinwa). It is a phenom-
enon that has been associated with the so-called ‘nuclear village’ (genshiryoku 
mura), a term that is meant to describe the collusion between the nuclear industry, 
politics, bureaucracy, media, and academia in Japan (Honma, 2016).  
 
In this context, it is noteworthy that neither a series of accidents in several Japanese 
nuclear sites in the 1990s – such as the one in the nuclear recycling facility in Tokai-
mura (1999) – nor the failure to solve the persistent safety issues in the high-perfor-
mance reactor in Monju (completed 1995, scrapped in 2016) led to a disruption of 
the “safety myth” (Nanasawa 2005, Yoshida 2016). This is problematic also from a 
disaster preparedness perspective: Various investigation commissions including the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) consider the firm belief in the absolute 
safety of nuclear power in Japan prior to 2011 a “major factor that contributed to the 
accident” (IAEA, 2015, v), precisely because on various levels, the lacking awareness 
of risks led to enormous deficits in disaster preparedness and mitigation (see also 
The National Diet of Japan, 2012).  
 
However, this is by no means to idealize the discourse on nuclear energy in Ger-
many, where Fukushima triggered an energy shift that in retrospect appears to be 
hasty and, in many aspects, poorly planned. In this context, previous studies have 
criticized that reporting of the disaster and the debate about the nuclear phase-out 
was not well-informed and moreover dominated by emotional argument rather than 
political deliberation (Nienierza, 2014; Weiss, Markutzyk, & Schwotzer, 2014). 
 
 
Methodology and sample profile  
 
As part of a larger research project, five expert interviews with German and Japa-
nese communication/social science scholars were conducted, as well as 19 in-depth, 
narrative interviews with German and Japanese journalists who covered the disas-
ter. For the sake of brevity, the following analysis will focus on a selection of 15 nar-
rative interviews which are most closely connected to the scope of this paper. The 
remaining four narrative interviews were not included because they were mainly re-
lated to other specific aspects of disaster reporting. The entire analysis is available 
in German language (Meissner, 2019). 
As this is a qualitative study, it is not the aim to achieve a representative sampling, 
an idea that follows quantitative research logic. Instead, the strategy used is theo-
retical sampling, which is rooted in the Grounded Theory by Glaser and Strauss 
(1967). While avoiding notably unbalanced samples, the aim is to achieve a diverse 
selection of cases that allows for building a variety of types that can be clearly dis-
tinguished. More and more cases are investigated until the developed typology 
reaches the state of theoretical saturation. Nohl and Ofner (2010) recommend this 
sampling strategy for interview analysis with the Documentary Method (outlined in 
the next section). 
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Table 1: interview samples 
 
 
media organization, 
political leaning (if evi-
dent)5 
name, position location of cover-
age 
G
er
m
an
 m
ed
ia
 
ARD (national public 
broadcaster, TV) 
Philipp Abresch, Tokyo bu-
reau chief 
Tokyo (temporarily 
evacuated to Osaka) 
Süddeutsche Zeitung (na-
tional newspaper), center-
left 
Christoph Neidhart, Tokyo 
correspondent 
Tokyo (temporarily 
evacuated to Osaka) 
Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (national newspa-
per), right-leaning 
Carsten Germis, Tokyo cor-
respondent 
Tokyo (temporarily 
evacuated to South 
Korea) 
Freelancer (various TV 
and newspaper), diverse 
Sonja Blaschke, Tokyo cor-
respondent 
Tokyo (temporarily 
evacuated to Ger-
many) 
ARD (national public 
broadcaster, radio) 
Peter Kujath, Tokyo bureau 
chief 
Tokyo (temporarily 
evacuated to Osaka) 
ZDF (national public TV 
broadcaster) 
Elmar Thevessen, head of 
news department, deputy 
editor-in-chief 
Mainz (Germany) 
tageszeitung (national 
newspaper), left-leaning  
Sven Hansen, foreign desk 
editor 
Berlin (Germany) 
Ja
p
an
es
e 
 
m
ed
ia
 
Anonymous (national eco-
nomic newspaper), right-
leaning  
anonymous, reporter  Tokyo 
NHK (national public 
broadcaster, TV) 
Junro Ōmori, documentary 
filmmaker 
 Tokyo 
J-WAVE (radio station for 
Tokyo metropolitan area) 
Hirofumi Nakano, freelance 
presenter, contributing edi-
tor 
 Tokyo 
Japan Times (English-lan-
guage national newspa-
per), left-leaning 
Sayuri Daimon, editor-in-
chief 
 Tokyo 
OurPlanet-TV (web-based 
activist video platform), 
left-leaning 
Hajime Shiraishi, editor-in-
chief 
 Tokyo 
Kahoku Shinpo (regional 
newspaper for Tōhoku) 
Hideya Terashima, senior 
reporter 
Miyagi/Fukushima 
prefectures 
JNN (national private TV 
network) 
Hajime Misawa, Berlin bu-
reau chief 
Osaka/Berlin 
Asahi Shimbun (national 
newspaper), left-leaning 
Ken Matsui, Berlin corre-
spondent 
Berlin 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 For more detailed information on the political leanings of German and Japanese news outlets, see 
Meißner (2019, 73–75, 97–98, 253–255). 
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The sample of this study centers on, but is not limited to, journalists of TV stations 
and newspapers. This is because these were arguably the most influential media for 
the Japanese audience, and because almost all German correspondents in Tokyo 
work for TV and newspapers. The seven German journalists all mainly work for na-
tional media; their eight Japanese counterparts represent national as well as re-
gional/local and, in one case, alternative media. 
 
The selected media organizations of either country range from left-wing (e.g. 
tageszeitung, OurPlanet-TV) to conservative (e.g. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
NHK). Twelve of the interviewees are male, three are female, which is due to both 
Japanese journalism as well as the group of German foreign correspondents in Ja-
pan being a male domain. Ten informants had their offices in Tokyo when the dis-
aster happened and therefore faced the same situation with regard to their personal 
safety. 
With one exception, none of the journalists requested anonymity. Therefore, the in-
terviewees are generally quoted with full name, but without age as the analysis 
showed no differences related to this characteristic (the informants were between 
37 and 60 years of age at the time of interview). I conducted the interviews in person 
between March and November 2014, the languages used were German, English, and 
Japanese.6  
 
 
Narrative interviews and Documentary Method 
 
According to Schütze (1977), who developed this interview type, a narrative ap-
proach encourages the informant to provide an impromptu narration that “entan-
gles” him in his experiences and therefore yields a detailed and authentic account of 
his memory. The method is designed to reduce the influence of the informant’s pre-
sent viewpoint on the interview content. It is furthermore a way to avoid interven-
tion by the interviewer as far as possible. This is of special importance in intercul-
tural research, where the interviewer’s primary understandings and normative as-
sumptions bear the danger of leading to artefacts (Kruse, Bethmann, Niermann, & 
Schmieder, 2012), especially if the cultural backgrounds involved are as different as 
Japan and Germany (Hayashi & Kopper, 2014). 
 
I analyzed the interviews with the Documentary Method (Nohl, 2010) which is based 
on the idea that the explicit content of an interview is not the only meaningful level 
of analysis. Instead, the Documentary Method is designed to reconstruct “the mean-
ing that underlies and is implied with these utterances,” as Nohl (ibid., 200–201) 
states. The implicit content is called “documentary meaning.” According to its orig-
inator Mannheim (1964, 1980), the concept resembles more than just an individual 
                                                 
6 The author of this paper is proficient in Japanese but had additional help by a native speaker and a 
professional translator during some of the interviews and throughout the translation in order to 
make sure to avoid errors and misunderstandings throughout the research process.. 
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mental state. Instead, the documentary meaning often points to a specific social con-
text, including shared routine practices and experiences. These patterns, which the 
Documentary Method calls “orientation frameworks,” can best be reconstructed 
from narrative and description rather than from argument or evaluation (Nohl 
2010, 196). The orientation frameworks can be validated by finding similar as well 
as diverging cases. This process is reiterated until the various orientation frame-
works (now labelled “sensegenetic types”) reach the state of theoretical saturation 
(ibid., 211–212).  
 
A further methodological step, the so-called “sociogenetic type formation,” looks at 
the social contexts which the reconstructed types belong to (ibid., 212–214). In other 
words, the researcher strives to identify the fundamental characteristics behind the 
diverging type formations. According to Nohl, this procedure is a way to provide a 
validated explanation of how the differences observed came into being. 
 
 
Results  
 
As the Documentary Method is an inductive form of analysis, there are no prede-
fined categories which are applied to the empirical material. Instead, the analysis is 
iterative and yields different type formations based on the comparative analysis of a 
variety of cases. In this study, the main points of comparison were 1) journalists’ 
perceptions of the disaster (type formations: low vs. high sensitivity to nuclear risk) 
and 2) journalists’ role concept concerning the political debate about nuclear risk 
(type formations: narrow focus on ‘official’ sources vs. broad focus on a variety of 
sources). 
Bearing in mind that the essence of the Documentary Method is the comparative 
interpretation of narratives, it is indispensable that this section gives substantial 
space to how the interviewees described their experiences. The analysis, however, 
will necessarily highlight examples that stand for the general tendencies found in 
the empirical material. 
 
Journalists’ perceptions of the disaster 
 
While interviewing German and Japanese journalists who lived and worked in To-
kyo, it soon became clear that both national groups experienced the disaster in dif-
ferent ways. 
 
First, I will look at how the interviewees describe the instant of the earthquake. The 
German journalist Abresch (ARD) remembered his excitement during the shake, re-
vealing that he did not take the situation seriously at first. Contrastingly, the Japa-
nese journalist Nakano (J-WAVE) described a sense of panic as he felt reminded of 
a disastrous earthquake that he experienced in 1995 in West Japan. While Abresch 
mentions the catastrophic tsunami only in brief terms and soon turns to the nuclear 
disaster, Nakano’s account is clearly dominated by the earthquake and tsunami. 
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Without being asked about it, he explained this thematic focus with the scale of the 
disaster and the fact that “we were so busy […] collecting the information about [the] 
tsunami” that the staff at J-WAVE had no time to pay attention to the nuclear plant.  
Meanwhile, Abresch paid attention almost exclusively to the events at the Fuku-
shima No. 1 power plant in the interview. He said that since he learned about the 
incident, he felt a personal threat with regard to the nuclear disaster because he an-
ticipated “this may affect us [in Tokyo], too.” After three reactors had exploded, 
Abresch and his team decided to evacuate from Tokyo to Osaka in West Japan and 
continue their work from there. It is striking that he devoted only little attention to 
his professional work but much more to personal security issues in the initial part 
of the interview.  
 
That is in stark contrast with Nakano, who did not mention any sense of personal 
threat posed by the nuclear disaster. Instead, he said that after the first explosion at 
Fukushima No. 1 reactor, “some […] groups or people started talking about the […] 
nuclear things, nuclear disaster, I mean, its possibility. But we didn’t take it seriously 
back then.” This statement shows little risk awareness with regard to the incident at 
the nuclear power plant. It is furthermore striking that the sources of such warnings 
appear to be nameless and therefore not very trustworthy (“some […] groups or peo-
ple”). Consequently, he remembers the nuclear disaster to be just a vague “possibil-
ity” at the time. This resembles the official language used by energy supplier TEPCO 
and the Japanese Government at the time, which Nakano later called “the only 
[credible] source of information we got back then.” 
 
From that perspective, it can be understood that Nakano appeared to be irritated by 
people buying and hoarding every-day goods such as water or toilet paper. Accord-
ing to him, the editorial staff at J-WAVE found that behavior “silly” and felt obliged 
to calm people down. With regard to the panic buyers he again only spoke of an 
earthquake and tsunami disaster; the idea that people were frightened because of 
the nuclear disaster did not occur to him. Abresch meanwhile remembered that he 
and some of his colleagues never felt a stronger personal threat than during the nu-
clear disaster. “[I've experienced] being robbed in Baghdad, being shot at in Bang-
kok, […] but radioactivity […] caught all of us on the wrong foot,” he said. 
In the further course of the interview, it became apparent that the nuclear disaster 
and its consequences were also the main focus of Abresch’s coverage from Japan. It 
was evident that the nuclear disaster deserved a lot of critical attention: For exam-
ple, he mentioned the risks of radioactive contamination, the failure of TEPCO and 
the Japanese government to support the people affected as well as the collusive 
power structures of the “nuclear village.” According to the correspondent’s words, 
the focus on nuclear issues was additionally encouraged by the editors he worked 
with: “I did notice that [ARD's] editorial offices are more interested in stories about 
Fukushima.” Meanwhile, according to Nakano's memory, it took about a month un-
til J-WAVE prioritized the nuclear over the natural disaster in the station’s report-
ing. Although memory may be inaccurate after such a long time, it is hard to deny 
that the thematic priorities were different. 
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If we look at another example, Süddeutsche Zeitung’s Neidhart7 was on a trip to 
Germany when the earthquake struck. He and his editor, though, did not see the 
necessity that Neidhart would return to Japan as long as there was news only of a 
natural disaster. Instead, the newspaper obviously considered it sufficient to report 
by using wire services. But when an incident at the nuclear plant was reported, “it 
was clear that I had to fly back immediately,” Neidhart said. This shows that the 
professional assessment of both editor and correspondent changed fundamentally 
as soon as a nuclear incident came into play.  
 
After returning to Japan, the correspondent still found himself entangled in the Ger-
man national discourse (although he consumed Japanese-language media, too). In 
an effort to assess the gravity of the situation, he for example referred to the em-
bassy’s recommendation to evacuate and the German International School that had 
closed down. Still, although his family was evacuated from Japan, he “did not as-
sume […] that Tokyo was in danger” and relocated himself to Osaka because of 
power blackouts. Compared to the other correspondents of German media, Neidhart 
appeared to be personally less sensitive to nuclear risk. He was nevertheless very 
critical of nuclear power and of the Japanese government’s “disinformation” con-
cerning the meltdowns of the Fukushima No. 1 plant.8 He also slammed the govern-
ment for not evacuating the heavily contaminated town of Iitatemura until one 
month after the disaster, leaving the locals exposed to substantial degrees of radio-
activity. 
 
The account of Terashima, a reporter of Kahoku Shinpō, the biggest regional news-
paper in the disaster area, offers some similarities as well as differences compared 
to Neidhart’s case. Although living only about 100 km from the nuclear accident, 
Terashima didn’t mention any sense of danger for himself, his wife or children. He 
was concerned about his parents, though, who lived in a place about 25 kilometers 
away from the crippled power plant. On a professional level, he paid substantial at-
tention to both the situation in the areas hit by the tsunami and the nuclear disaster. 
In the course of his narration, the interviewee shifted his professional attention to 
those affected by the economic fallout of the nuclear disaster, like farmers and fish-
ermen suffering from “harmful rumors”. In his reporting, Terashima strived to mit-
igate concerns about contaminated food by highlighting rigorousness of safety 
checks. This perspective on nuclear risk fundamentally differs from the German in-
terviewees who overwhelmingly viewed attempts to alleviate concerns about radio-
activity as a form of disinformation. Still, it has to be noted that Terashima, too, 
criticized the hesitant response to the situation in Iitatemura, which he covered for 
the Kahoku Shinpō. 
 
                                                 
7 Christoph Neidhart is Swiss but has been Süddeutsche Zeitung’s Tokyo correspondent since 2002. 
8 TEPCO conceded meltdowns only two months after the disaster. It later admitted it had known 
much earlier. 
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Among the Japanese journalists, there are also cases where journalists showed sub-
stantial awareness of nuclear risk, but faced difficulties to report due to their organ-
izational context. For example, according to the anonymous interviewee working for 
a business newspaper, the energy companies advertising in the paper played an im-
portant role with regard to journalistic content. “The electricity companies gave the 
conservative newspapers money to get articles published like ‘how safe is nuclear 
power?’”, he said, later adding that he witnessed that “the truth couldn’t be reported 
because the advertising companies exerted pressure” even with regard to regular 
newspaper content. In a similar way, NHK’s filmmaker Ōmori described political 
considerations making it difficult to air a documentary about radioactive contami-
nation in the exclusion zone9.  
The narrow bounds of editorial freedom at NHK prompted another interviewee, Shi-
raishi, to resign from the broadcaster in 2001 and found a participatory activist 
video platform, OurPlanet-TV. After the nuclear disaster, it focused on the situation 
of local residents in Fukushima as well as on the anti-nuclear movement. According 
to Shiraishi, OurPlanet-TV offered a platform for those who were continuously mar-
ginalized by traditional Japanese media. 
 
While the disaster led to the downfall of the nuclear “safety myth” in Japan, it also 
contributed to a political shift in Germany. Even the conservative newspaper Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung at least temporarily departed from its formerly pro-nu-
clear stance (Kepplinger & Lemke 2014, 2015, Nienierza 2014), showing that the 
anti-nuclear discourse reached the status of a broad consensus in German society. 
It has to be viewed in this context that the newspaper’s Japan correspondent Germis 
said he struggled with the expectations of his editor who urged him to report certain 
sensational stories on the disaster the correspondent considered one-sided. For Ger-
mis, it amounted to a dilemma: “If you don’t play along […], you risk losing [your 
editor’s] attention,” he said. Other German correspondents did not mention any 
pressure regarding the tendency of the article, but several made clear that their ed-
itors had a strong preference for reports about the nuclear disaster. An exception is 
freelancer Blaschke, who mentioned a case where an article she proposed to a news-
paper was rejected because it was deemed “too critical of nuclear power.” 
 
As the examples outlined so far document different national perceptions of the nu-
clear disaster, it is insightful to look at the case of Misawa, who was exposed to the 
public perception of events in both Japan and Germany. He was in Osaka (West 
Japan) when the disaster happened, but was scheduled to leave for Berlin to work 
as a correspondent for the Japanese private TV broadcasting network JNN on March 
20, 2011. Shortly before he left, he was assigned to welcome the crew of German 
Second Television (ZDF) at his station’s headquarters in Osaka. The ZDF team had 
evacuated from Tokyo, because it was “afraid of the radiation,” as Misawa repeated 
several times with obvious astonishment. 
 
                                                 
9 After the nuclear disaster, the Japanese Government asked the Japanese media to stay out of the 
exclusion zone. Ōmori‘s team defied the government’s request and an internal order by NHK.  
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After Misawa had begun to work as a correspondent in Berlin, his attitude towards 
nuclear power soon started to change. He described how being exposed to the dis-
course in Germany after the Fukushima Disaster made him more aware of nuclear 
risk. He started to appreciate that people were also looking at the disadvantages of 
the technology and criticized the Japanese, who, according to Misawa, “began to 
know” about nuclear risk only “after the accident.” The example of Misawa shows 
that national discourses are not necessarily static but can in fact permeate each 
other. This phenomenon could also be observed in a few other cases, although not 
as clearly. The other formerly Berlin-based Japanese correspondent interviewed for 
this study, Matsui (Asahi Shimbun), said he tried to contribute to the discussion in 
Japan by reporting about the shift to renewable energy in Germany. The German 
correspondents Kujath and Germis similarly mentioned how they tried to middle 
between the discourses in the two countries as they tried to calm down concerns 
about the situation in Japan and tried to explain why the Japanese did not fully 
abandon nuclear power after the disaster10.  
 
Despite of their openness towards the discourse in Japan, both Kujath and Germis, 
like all the other German correspondents interviewed for this study, temporarily 
evacuated from Tokyo for security concerns. That is in stark contrast with the Japa-
nese interviewees who hardly ever mentioned any concern with regard to being in 
Tokyo, let alone the idea to evacuate to another place. The only one who expressed 
that he felt directly threatened by radioactivity is NHK’s Ōmori, who reported from 
inside the nuclear exclusion zone. Another case was that of Daimon, who gave to 
understand she was concerned about her daughter but could not leave Tokyo be-
cause of her professional obligations as head of Japan Times’ national news. 
 
Although the Documentary Method focuses on narration rather than argument or 
evaluation, it is insightful to look at how the journalists reflected upon the different 
national tendencies in reporting the disaster. Blaschke, for instance, mentions the 
effect of the Chernobyl Disaster in Germany. Abresch also remembers his fear that 
Germany, divided between East and West, would become a “nuclear battleground” 
if the Cold War had heated up: “I grew up in this knowledge, and I still remember I 
was very frightened.” Remarkably, none of the Japanese journalists made any his-
torical reference with regard to nuclear coverage. Instead, they mentioned situa-
tional or structural circumstances like the difficulty to get reliable information in the 
aftermath of the disaster or the dependence on official information. Against this 
backdrop, it seems hard to deny that different national discourses on nuclear risk in 
the two countries indeed shaped journalists’ perception of the disaster. 
 
Journalists’ role concept concerning the political discourse on risk 
 
With regard to the political discourse on nuclear risk, I would like to focus on two 
significant aspects: 1) their attitude towards official and alternative sources, and 2) 
                                                 
10 It was not possible to determine why some correspondents appeared to be more open to the 
discourses of their host country than others. Language proficiency did not seem to make a difference. 
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their attitude towards anti-nuclear activism. Both issues played a role in the context 
of reporting the nuclear disaster. 
Concerning 1), I have pointed out already that in the aftermath of the disaster, 
Nakano mainly considered official sources11 as being trustworthy. This is in line with 
the general tendency found among the Japanese interviewees in the sample. For in-
stance, according to the business newspaper’s anonymous interviewee,  
 
“70% of the media’s news sources were government and authorities. […] the Japanese media 
do not have the ability to assess the announcements of independent institutions […] what we 
could do back then was to report the official statements of the government as quickly as 
possible.” 
 
The quote has to be understood as a reference to the Japanese system of ‘reporter 
clubs’ (kisha kurabu), i.e. spaces provided by ministries and authorities, but also big 
companies for the media’s day-to-day coverage, including press conferences, brief-
ings et cetera (Freeman, 2000).12 As these clubs are the main source of information 
for Japan’s big media (especially newspapers, TV and wire services), it seemed un-
thinkable for the interviewee to deviate from the official announcements provided 
there, let alone to use information provided by “independent institutions.” Or, as 
Japan Times’ Daimon puts it, “Japanese media is very conservative. Unless we con-
firm things, we don't really report and especially knowing that that's going to trigger 
panic.” Following this logic, she declared that like other Japanese media her news-
paper tended to avoid the term “meltdown” until three core meltdowns were offi-
cially confirmed by TEPCO in late May, 2011 – although experts had come to his 
conclusion already shortly after the disaster. 
 
On the other hand, there are cases like investigative documentary filmmaker Ōmori 
(NHK) and Shiraishi (OurPlanet-TV), who questioned the official statements con-
cerning the nuclear disaster from the start. Ōmori defied NHK’s order to its staff and 
went to the nuclear exclusion zone with a team of experts to gather radiation data 
independently. Meanwhile, OurPlanet-TV reported briefings of independent insti-
tutions like the Citizens’ Nuclear Information Center (CNIC) that were widely ig-
nored by the traditional media. It is important to note, however, that these cases are 
extremely rare and are not to insinuate being representative for Japanese main-
stream media (Itō, 2012). 
 
For the correspondents of German media, skepticism of official information in Ja-
pan was apparently common sense after the disaster. Although it is hard to compare 
the source relations of domestic and foreign journalists, it is conspicuous that anti-
                                                 
11 From the context of the interview, it can be understood that by “official sources,” Nakano refers to 
the central government as well as authorities. He apparently views the public broadcaster NHK to be 
equally trustworthy. 
12 The press clubs have been criticized for their close and often cozy relationships between journalists 
and the individuals they cover, see Freeman (2000). 
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nuclear or environmentalist NGOs like Greenpeace are legitimate sources for jour-
nalists like Neidhart and Thevessen, who represent mainstream media such as 
Süddeutsche Zeitung and ZDF.  
 
This observation corresponds with the journalists’ attitudes towards the anti-nu-
clear movement. For the representatives of German media, it was natural to report 
about the anti-nuclear rallies in Germany after the Fukushima Disaster. That is not 
only true for Hansen, editor of the leftist, anti-nuclear tageszeitung, but also for 
Thevessen (ZDF), who represents a public TV broadcaster: “when there are big 
demonstrations in Berlin, we can’t ignore that,” Thevessen argued, despite declaring 
to be personally a supporter of nuclear energy. 
  
On the contrary, some Japanese media have been accused of largely ignoring the 
anti-nuclear demonstrations in Tokyo and elsewhere. This is also the case for the 
anonymous interviewee’s business newspaper. He explained his paper’s reluctant 
coverage of the anti-nuclear demonstrations with its outspoken pro-nuclear stance. 
He argued that there would have been some marginal reports, but only “[b]ecause 
you get criticized […] when you say you don’t write anything at all about it […].” His 
aloofness towards the anti-nuclear movement, however, is not only due to organiza-
tional culture. To the contrary, he seemed to be suspicious about the protestors as 
he called them “yatsu” (derogatory pronoun, roughly “that kind of people”).  
 
In the same context, it is worthwhile to look at the case of Berlin correspondent 
Misawa again. Like with regard to his growing awareness of nuclear risk, he changed 
his attitude towards political protest after starting to report from Germany. By wit-
nessing the big-scale demonstrations against nuclear power in Berlin after the Fu-
kushima Disaster and other events related to the anti-nuclear movement, he became 
convinced that such a form of public self-expression is “very mature” and should be 
done also in Japan. There, according to Misawa’s words, people are skeptical of po-
litical activism: “Japanese people tend to think that people who are doing some 
demonstration is something for activists, […] not [for] the normal people. […] But 
in Germany, so many […] people go to the demonstrations and do something.” The 
quote outlines Misawa’s perception that while taking part in demonstrations is 
widely accepted in Germany, protestors in Japan risk social isolation. According to 
Shiraishi, a series of student riots in the 1960s and 1970s led to an “image that citi-
zens who merely express their opinion are considered to be dangerous is still com-
monplace.”  
 
Hansen, foreign desk editor of the German leftist tageszeitung, described a different 
situation for Germany. Beginning with the first local protests against nuclear power 
plants in the early 1970s, he said that the anti-nuclear discourse gradually became 
common sense in Germany, until the Fukushima Disaster served as final trigger for 
the nuclear phase-out: “this debate […] has made its way into the heart of society 
[…] it is mainstream since Fukushima. It hadn’t been like that before.” 
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Type formation: nuclear risk sensitivity and trustworthiness of politi-
cal actors 
 
Based on the comparative interview analysis illustrated above, I suggest to distin-
guish between two pairs of ‘orientation frameworks’ respectively ‘sensegenetic 
types’13: 1) low sensitivity to nuclear risk – high sensitivity to nuclear risk (again to 
be distinguished between personal and professional level14), and 2) fixation on offi-
cial sources – openness for alternative sources and political actors.  
 
With regard to nuclear risk sensitivity, the interview analysis showed that indeed 
there are parallels between the initial (personal) perception of the nuclear disaster 
and their later (professional) experience (table 2). Cases that include elements of 
both low and high sensitivity types are shown in the middle. The ‘sociogenetic type 
formation’ furthermore shows that the types clearly correspond with the nationality 
of the interviewees. 
 
This is not to imply monocausality, however, as other factors like organizational cul-
ture have been identified as well. Also, there is some diversity, for example in the 
sense that there are two Japanese journalists who were exposed to foreign dis-
courses on the disaster as well and had a higher sensitivity to nuclear risk (Daimon, 
Misawa). According to several statements made by other correspondents, one Ger-
man correspondent allegedly entered the nuclear exclusion zone after the disaster.15 
Two other German correspondents felt they had to counter hyperbole with regard 
to the nuclear disaster and tried to calm the German audience down (Kujath, Ger-
mis). Moreover, two (clearly outstanding) cases showed no or little personal risk 
sensitivity, but a high awareness on the professional level (Ōmori, Shiraishi). 
 
Concerning the journalists’ attitude towards the political debate about nuclear risk, 
two contrasting types can be reconstructed from the interviews that also corre-
sponded with the national groups. For Japanese journalists, legitimate sources are 
mostly official institutions and (to varying degrees) citizens affected by the disaster. 
With few exceptions, they seem to be ignorant or even disapproving with regard to 
sources related to political activism like NGOs or the anti-nuclear movement. In the 
case of the journalists working for German media, alternative sources and political 
activists are generally considered legitimate, if not important sources for their cov-
erage, even among pro-nuclear journalists like ZDF’s Thevessen. This points to the 
fact that political activism, and specifically the anti-nuclear movement, is more 
                                                 
13 In the framework of the Documentary Method, sensegenetic types are the type formations that are 
reconstructed by means of the comparative analysis of different cases. Sociogenetic types refer to the 
social circumstances that correspond with the different sensegenetic types. Possible examples are 
nationality, gender, age, education, et cetera (see methods section). 
14 By risk sensitivity on the personal level, I refer to the journalists’ concern with regard to their own 
health risk. Risk sensitivity on the professional level refers to the attention the interview partners 
paid to the nuclear disaster and its potential health-related consequences from a work-related 
(journalistic) perspective. 
15  The journalist agreed to an interview but later cancelled it. Efforts to reschedule the interview 
failed. 
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widely accepted in the German society. Also, it has to be taken into account that the 
reporter clubs in Japan tie the media system closely to official sources such as the 
government and big companies like TEPCO. 
 
Table 2: personal and professional nuclear risk sensitivity 
 
 low sensitivity to nuclear risk high sensitivity to nuclear risk 
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Nakano (J-WAVE) 
Terashima (Kahoku Shinpō) 
anonymous (business paper) 
Ōmori (NHK) 
Shiraishi (OurPlanet-TV) 
 
 
 
Abresch (ARD TV) 
Blaschke (freelancer) 
Kujath (ARD radio) 
Germis (Frankfurter  
Allgemeine Zeitung) 
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Nakano (J-WAVE) 
Terashima (Kahoku Shinpō) 
anonymous (business paper) 
Matsui (Asahi Shimbun) 
 
 
Abresch (ARD TV)  
Blaschke (freelancer) 
Neidhart (Südd. Zeitung) 
Thevessen (ZDF) 
Hansen (tageszeitung) 
Ōmori (NHK) 
Shiraishi (OurPlanet-TV) 
 
* Germis was left out as he mainly worked as business correspondent at the time. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The objectives of this paper were: 1) to reconstruct how national discourses on nu-
clear risk shaped German and Japanese journalists’ perception of the Fukushima 
Disaster, and 2) to reconstruct how journalists conceived their role in the political 
debate about nuclear risk. 
 
The study has shown that the journalists’ cultural background clearly shaped both 
their personal risk perception as well as their role concept in the discourse on nu-
clear risk. However, there is diversity within each national group, and the different 
discourses can also permeate each other in some cases. This leads me to the conclu-
sion that it is not an essentialist notion of ‘nation’ or ‘culture’, but the involvement 
into historically evolved normative discourse(s) that serves as an important macro 
factor for journalists’ risk perception as well as their attitude towards anti-nuclear 
activism. This key finding sheds light on Beck’s notion that the assessment of risk 
Daimon 
(Japan Times) 
Neidhart 
(Südd. 
Daimon 
(Japan Times) 
Misawa 
(JNN) 
Kujath 
(ARD) 
Vol.9No.2Autumn/Winter 2019  www.globalmediajournal.de 
 
18 
 
varies between cultures (Beck, 2009). The fierce debate about nuclear power in Ger-
many and the experience of the Chernobyl Disaster are among the key components 
that shaped social norms in wide parts of society and, indirectly, also German jour-
nalists’ perception of the Fukushima Disaster. In the case of their Japanese counter-
parts, the key factor was the nuclear safety myth in Japan prior to March 11, 2011. 
 
Against this backdrop, it is questionable whether both German and Japanese jour-
nalists intentionally distorted the events in East Japan, for example based on polit-
ical convictions. It has to be acknowledged that personal perception of risk takes 
effect before a journalist starts to look at an issue with professional eyes. This dis-
tinction is important because academic analysis usually focuses on journalistic pro-
fessionalism but seldom takes into account the implicit, ‘pre-professional’ founda-
tions of reporting, i.e. historically shaped norms shared across (significant propor-
tions of) society. Additionally, the interview analysis illustrated that German and 
Japanese journalists have a different understanding of their role in the political de-
bate: For German journalists, it was self-evident that they had to include the voices 
of anti-nuclear activists in their coverage, while Japanese journalists were much 
more hesitant to do so. This is due to the fact that media reporting in Japan typically 
relies on official announcements conveyed through a system of reporter clubs. 
 
A limitation of this study is that foreign correspondents and domestic journalists 
reported for different audiences and thus had different relations with sources; pro-
fessional behavior may therefore follow different patterns. However, at least at the 
personal level (with regard to one’s own health), risk perception is not related to 
audiences. Another limitation is inherent in the method: Although the narrative in-
terview is designed to retrieve a spontaneous, detailed (and therefore largely au-
thentic) account of the informants’ memory, one has to keep in mind it is only a 
reconstruction of their experiences and not a flawless record of reality. 
 
For an outlook, one might ask in how far social norms concerning nuclear energy 
have been renegotiated in Japanese media after the nuclear disaster. While more 
liberal news outlets clearly more awareness of nuclear risk, conservative Japanese 
media still hardly report on the issue (Abe, 2015). Moreover, the government has 
launched several attempts to silence the more liberal voices in the Japanese media 
including the nuclear-skeptic Asahi Shimbun (Fackler, 2016). The Olympic Games 
of Tokyo in 2020 have also been used for the narrative of nuclear safety: In a much 
noted speech before the Olympic Committee in 2013, Prime Minister Abe assured 
the audience that the situation in Fukushima was “under control”, despite all loom-
ing problems with radioactive contamination and the decommissioning of the crip-
pled reactors. As a symbol for the reconstruction and recovery process, Fukushima 
prefecture was also included in the locations where Olympic competitions take 
place.  
 
I therefore conclude that the government has tried to reinstall the nuclear safety 
myth. Regardless of whether one supports or opposes nuclear power, this is highly 
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problematic: According to the IAEA (2015, v), whose aim is to promote and super-
vise the peaceful and safe use of atomic power, the unshakable belief in the safety of 
nuclear power was a “major factor that contributed to the accident.” Neither the op-
erator nor the government nor the regulator were “sufficiently prepared for a severe 
nuclear accident in March 2011.” (ibid.) 
 
The conclusions of the IAEA highlight that a broad debate about technological risk 
is necessary to prevent further cases where interests and collusion between respon-
sible actors prevail over safety concerns. In this regard, it may be helpful that risk 
perceptions vary greatly between cultures because dominant normative assump-
tions within a given society can be challenged more easily when compared to those 
in other countries. More comparative research should therefore be conducted that 
includes the social and historical context of journalistic risk communication. 
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